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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MARION E. TIBBITTS, and
ROSE WHEEL WRIGHT TIBBITTS,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

'

Case
No. 10512

RHUEL 0. OPENSHAW and
DARLENE 0. OPENSHAW,
Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONDENT'S BRrEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents are of the opinion that the Statement of Facts
as related by the defendants is incomplete and unilateral and in
order for the Court to have before it all of the facts, we will relate
them as follows:
Plaintiffs, prior to July 31, 1962, were engaged in constructing two houses on property owned by them in Riverdale, Weber
County, Utah. The real property is described in the plaintiffs'
Exhibit A and involves Lots 7 and 8, Rainbow Subdivision in
Weber County, Utah, together with a piece of adjoining unsubdivided property.
Plaintiffs, as builders, employed a licensed contractor, Lawrence Lutz, to do the carpentry work and some of the cement work
on the houses to be built on Lots 7 and 8, (T. 31, 22) and to
supervise the other employees and their work (T. 30, 31). They
also employed licensed contractors to do the cement work, (T. 29)
electrical work (T. 117), plumbing and heating (T. 27, 117), and
the roofing (T. 116).
Defendant Darlene 0. Openshaw became interested in pur·
chasing the two homes together with the adjacent vacant prop·
erty and on several occasions went through the two homes while
they were in various stages of construction and apparently was
satisfied with what she saw (T. 75). Upon the completion of the
houses on Lots 7 and 8, and on July 31, 1962, the plaintiffs and
defendants had Attorney Dale T. Browning prepare a Uniform
Real Estate Contract, (plaintiffs' Exhibit A) covering the sale
of the above referred to real property. The deeds to the real
property were placed in escrow with Franklin D. Maughan, an
abstracter of Ogden, Utah (Plaintiffs' Exhibits Band C). Defend·
ants entered into possession of the property, rented the upstairs of
one home for $150.00 a month and the other home was rented for a
2

total of $255.00 (T. 48). Defendants made the payments pursuant
to said contract until a balance of $4,379.32 was left remaining.
Although the contract provided that the total property would
not be released to the defendants until the entire purchase price
was paid in full, the defendant, Darlene 0. Openshaw, on October 22, 1964, informed Mr. Maughan, the escrow agent, that the
final payment had been made and requested that the deeds be
delivered to her. This statement was false, there being approximately $4,379.32 still owing. However, the escrow agent had the
deed recorded in the defendants' name (T. 96, 81). Suit was filed
March 17, 1965, seeking a re-conveyance of the property until the
contract was completed or for the sum owing.
DISPOSITION OF TIIE TRIAL COURT
At the conclusion of the parties' evidence the jury viewed the
premises and inspected the houses and the cause was submitted
to the jury on special interrogatories, Special Interrogatory No.
9 reading as follows: "I. Do you find it proven by clear and
convincing evidence that the plaintiff perpetrated a fraud upon
the defendants as the term 'fraud' is here used in these instructions?"
To this interrogatory, the jury answered "no", and pursuant thereto
the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs as prayed
for together with costs, interest and attorney's fees.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1. TIIERE WERE NO IMPLIED WARRANTIES
IN REGARD TO TIIE HOUSES; THE HOUSES WERE BUILT
IN A WORKMANLIKE MANNER AND SUITABLE FOR
HABITATION; THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE
BUILDER-VENDOR DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE
BUILDING CODE OF THE AREA IN WHICH THE STRUCTURES ARE LOCATED.
3

It is strongly urged by the defendants-appellants that there
was a breach of warranty on the part of the plaintiffs-respondents
in the construction of the homes and the sale of the real estate.
The Court's attention is called to paragraph 20 of the Unifonn
Real Estate Contract entered into between the parties and which
is idenified as plaintiffs' Exhibit A, which reads as follows: "It
is hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto
that the buyer accepts the said property in its present condition
and that there are no representations, covenants or agreements
between the parties hereto with reference to said property, except
as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto."
Th.e ruling of the Court is correct as is shown in Jensen's Used
Cars vs. Rice (Utah) 7 Ut. 276, 323 P. 259, 260.
"Elementary it is that in construing contracts we seek
to determine the intention of the parties, but it is also ele·
mentary and of extreme practical importance that we hold
contracting parties to their clear and understandable Ian·
guage deliberately committed in writing and endorsed by
them as signatories thereto. Were this not so, business, one
with another, among our citizens would be relegated to the
chaotic and the basic purpose of the law to supply enforce·
able rules of conduct for the maintenance and improvement
of an orderly society, welfare and progress would find itself
impotent. It is not unreasonable to hold one responsible for
language for which he himself espouses. Such language is
the only implement he gives us to fashion a determination
as to the intentions of the parties. Under such circumstances
we should not be required to embosom any request that we
ignore that very language. This is as it should be. The rule
excluding matters outside the four corners of a clear and
understandable document is a fair one and one's conten·
tions concerning his intent should extend no further than
his own clear expression.
"It is urged correctly that to admit matters outside .a
contract would do violence with the principles that one is
bound by his manifestations of assent and that irrespective
of such contentions such matters properly are excludable by
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the parole evidence rule, which rule counsel suggests is one
of substantive law rather than one of evidence. Whatever
kind one calls it, the rule that excludes such evidence is a
common-sense rule."
In the case of Steiber vs. Palumbo 347 P. 2d 978 (Ore.), the
defendant sold a completed home to the plaintiff. Plaintiff claimed
a breach of warranty because of lack of proper footings under the
house. In the consummation of the transaction only three papers
were employed, an earnest money receipt, a deed and a mortgage.
None of the three papers contained any warranty of the quality
of the house or the character of the soil under it. The Court affirmed the lower Court which had previously stated: "There is
no such thing as an implied warranty in connection with the sale
of real estate". And the Supreme Court stated: "No decision has
come to our attention which permitted recovery by the vendee
of housing upon a theory of implied warranty". In doing so, they
cited Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, Section 926: "One
who contracts to buy real estate may indeed refuse to complete
the transaction if the vendor's title is bad, but one who accepts a
deed generally has no remedy for defective title, except such as
the covenants in his deed may give him. Therefore, if there are
no covenants he has no redress, though he gets no title. Still more
clearly, there can be no warranty of quality or condition implied
in the sale of real estate.

"It is generally true also that any express agreements in regard to land contained in a contract to sell it are merg;ed in the
deed if the purchaser accepts a conveyance."
Further quoting from Levy vs. C. Young Construction Co.,
1958 26 N.J. 300, 139 Atlantic 2d, 738:
"Absent any covenant binding defendant to sell a well constructed house, plaintiffs cannot sue upon an implied warranty * * * *
5

"As defendant notes, the policy reasons underlying the rule
that the acceptance of a deed without covenants as to con~truction is the cut-off point so far as the vendor's liability
is concerned are rather obvious. Were plaintiffs successful
under the facts presented to us, an element of uncertainty
would pervade the entire field. Real estate transactions
would become chaotic if vendors were subjected to liability
after they had parted with the ownership and control of the
premises. They could never be certain as to the limits or !
termination of their liability. The rule which we impose in
the circumstances of the present action works no harshness
on purchasers of real estate. Plaintiffs had an opportunity to
protect themselves by extracting warranties or guaranties
from the defendant in the contract of sale and by reserving i
them in the deed * * * "
In Harmon National Real Estate Corporation vs. Eagan 241
N.Y. Supplement 708, 709, suit was brought by a mortgagee and
the defendant mortgagor counter-claimed on the ground "That
at the time the house was sold to the defendant the plaintiff well
knew that the same was uninhabitable." The Court said:
"For after the contract of sale has been executed and the
conveyance accepted, the Grantee must rely solely on the
covenants in his deed. If his deed contains no covenants he
is without a remedy, either for eviction or encumbrance.
Upon the sale of real property, the rule caveat emptor applies * * * no implied covenant arises from a conveyance of
real property."
In the case of Kerr vs. Parsons, 1948, 83 Ohio App. 204, 82
N.E. Second 303, 305, the action was based upon the plaintiffs
purchase of a second-hand house; after purchase he brought an
action for damages against the Seller on the ground that the latter
had falsely represented that a well on the premises would supply
enough water for household uses. A verdict and judgment for the
defendant were reversed because of prejudicial instuctions. Inter
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alia it was noted that the trial court had charged as to warranty.
In reversing the appellate Court said:
"Ordinarily there is no implied warranty as to the condition
of real estate sold or leased and oral evidence of a warranty
would not be admissible to add to a deed or lease."
In the case of Berger vs. Burkoff 1952, 200 Maryland 561,
92 At. 2d, 376, 378, the action was based on the claim that the
basement in a new home was improperly waterproofed. It was
the contention of the appellants that there was an implied warranty not expressed to furnish a structurally satisfactory house.
The Court held there were no implied warranties in the sale of
real estate. To the same effect, see the New York case of Dolezel
vs. Fialkoff, 2 At. 2d 642, 151 N.Y. Sup. Second 734.
Although Oregon has a statute stating specifically that there
are no implied warranties, the Oregon case previously cited of
Steiber vs. Palumbo concluded as follows: "It will be noticed from
the foregoing that even apart from legislations such as 0.R.S.
93.140, the law refuses to imply in favor of the purchaser of an
existing house warranties as to quality. As to purchasers of that
kind, the rule of caveat emptor applies and he must reduce his
purported warranties to written contractual form if he expects to
base an action upon them."
For further citations in regard to this proposition, see 78
A.L.R., 2, 446.
Defendants-appellants cite three main cases in support of
their theory. In Carpenter vs. Donohoe 338 P. 2d 399 (Colo.)
and /ones vs. Gatewood 381 P 2d 158 (Okla.), both cases deal
with "hazardous" condition or conditions that make the houses
not fit for habitation. The Carpenter case dealt with walls caving
in that made living in the house hazardous and the Jones case
concerned itself with water seeping through the concrete slab
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that made the house unlivable. These cases are therefore distin. '
guishable from the case at bar for the reason that the houses have
been occupied continuously since possession by defendants either
by defendants themselves or by others who pay well for the
privilege.
The third case relied upon, Schipper vs. Leavitt & Sons, Inc.,
207 A. 2 314 is a purely tort case and has no application to the
case at bar.

It is difficult to see how it can seriously be contended that
the _houses were not suitable for habitation inasmuch as the upstairs of the white house was rented for $150.00 per month and
the brown house for a total of $255.00 (T. 48) and at the present ,
time the defendants-appellants are residing in the white house
(T. 38).
In rcegard to the workmanship on the homes and the quality
of lumber used therein, Mr. Lutz, defendants' witness, stated that
the carpentry work was satisfactory, (T. 24) and that the lumber
was strong enough, (T. 36). Harvey Hill, defendants' witness, stated
that the lumber used was satisfactory if the spanning was proper,
(T. 63) but that he did not know whether or not the requirements for proper spanning had been complied with (T. 69). There
was other evidence from another licensed contractor that the
materials that went into the houses made for good construction
(T. 162).

Concerning the furnace, there was absolutely no testimony
as to whether or not the furnace was ventilated properly, but there
was testimony that the furnace was installed by a licensed heating contractor (T. 27, 117).
The electrical work was done by a licensed electrical contractor and not by the plaintiffs-respondents (T. 117).
8
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Plaintiffs-respondents deny that there was any express warranty that the roofs were "20 year roofs" (T. 116) and defendantsappellants' witness, Harvey Hill, stated that he did not know for
a fact that the roofs were not what are called "20 year roofs"
(T. 68).
Alhough there was testimony that the houses were at least
partially insulated plaintiffs-respondents deny that there was any
representation whatsoever made as to whether or not the houses
were fully insulated (T. 116).
The construction loan was obtained through State Savings
& Loan Company of Salt Lake City and several inspections were
made by representatives of State Savings & Loan Company prior
to releasing the construction money (T. 149).
Although defendants-appellants, over objection, introduced
zoning ordinances, building codes and electrical codes, there was
no evidence whatsoever that the structures in question did not
comply with the zoning ordinance, the building codes or electrical
codes.
POINT 2.

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS SHOULD BE

BOUND BY THE CONTRACT THAT THEY EXECUTED.
Defendants-appellants' point 2 would appear to be beyond
argument inasmuch as there is ample evidence from defendants'
witnesses as well as plaintiffs' that if there were in fact any implied warranties, that they were not breached. There seems to
he more than ample evidence to support the jury's vedict.
In raising the point, defendants-appellants presume that the
only reason that they did not prevail was because of the paragraph 20 in the Uniform Contract which stated that there were
no waranties either expess or implied-this is not so--defendantsappellants did not prevail because they failed to convince the jury,
rither from evidence or a careful view and inspection of the prem9

ises that the houses were poorly constructed, of defective materials, or were not fit for human habitation.
However, it is the established law in this state that contracting parties, not acting under disabilities shall be bound by the ·
terms of their contracts.
Jensen's Used Cars vs. Rice, 7 Ut. 2 276, 323 P. 2d 259.

In addition to the express provisions of the contract, defendants-appellants obtained deeds of Warranty which contained no ·
covenants or restricti:ons. This was the second chance defendants·
appellants had to protect themselves if they were concerned, which
they were not. After the deed was accepted, defendants-appellants
could rely only on the covenants in the deed and there werie none
in regard to the items of which they complain. See Harmon Na-'
tional Real Estate Corp. vs. Egan 241 N.Y. Sup. 708, 709. Steiber
vs. Palumbo, Supra., Levy vs. C. Young Const. Co., Supra.

It wasn't until three years later, after suit was instituted for
final payment or return of the deed that the alleged defocts were
brought to light. Defendants-appellants are guilty of !aches ii
there is any merit to their complaints. Section 60-3-9, Utah Code
Ann. 1953 provides as follows:
"But if, after acceptance of the goods, the buyer fails to give
notice to the seller of the breach of any promise or warranty
within a reasonable time after the buyer knows, or ought to ,
know, of such breach, the seller shall not be liable therefor."
Inasmuch as there were no warranties contained in the Uni·
form Real Estate Contract, plaintiffs-respondents' Exhibit A, nor
were there any reservations contained in the Deed issued pursuant
to said contract, plaintiffs-appellants' Exhibits B and C, there were
no warranties implied or expressed, therefore they could not be
breached and the defendants-appellants have given no reason why
they should not be held to their contract. Jensen's Used Cars vs
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Rice 7 Ut. 2d, 276, 323 P. 2d, 259, 260; Harmon National Real
Estate Corporation vs. Eagan, 241 N.Y. Sup. 708, 709, Levy vs. C.
Young Const. Co., Supa.
CONCLUSION
The evidence shows that the houses were well constructed
with good materials and good workmanship; that they were fit
for habitation; that there were no warranties expressed or implied
and no breaches thereof and that defendants-appellants should
be held to their contract and the verdict of the jury affirmed by
this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE B, HANDY
521 Eccles Building
Ogden, Utah
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